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ABSTRACT
Alternative management programs for the sea scallop 
Placopecten magellanicus were discussed and compared. Net 
economic rents (profits) under three different management options 
including non-transferable effort (NTE), individual transferable 
effort (ITE), and individual transferable quota (ITQ) regulations 
were estimated for a panel data sample of nine scallop vessels.
Through linear programming models, rental/lease prices for 
quota (shadow values) were determined by vessel. These values 
along with their corresponding quota amounts were regressed 
utilizing Tobin's censored regression technique, thereby forming 
an inverse derived demand function for each vessel. The most 
efficient vessels within the fleet were willing to pay the 
greatest amount per unit of quota at the various levels of quota 
supplied.
Through the summation of all vessels' demand functions, an 
aggregate inverse demand curve for the fleet and total fleet 
rents before trade were approximated. Resulting equilibrium 
market prices for quota were calculated for the ITE and ITQ 
programs. Finally, total fleet rent gains from trade (ITE and 
ITQ programs only) were examined.
ITE- and ITQ-based management programs offered the sample 
fleet greater economic rents compared to the current NTE-oriented 
management program. Although these results may or may not 
reflect the potential outcome of either approach on the East 
coast scallop fleet as a whole, if these results were 
extrapolated over the whole fleet, approximately $1,900,000 in 
total rent would be generated by the vessels remaining in the 
fishery at pre-Amendment 4 inception approximate catch levels if 
trading of effort were allowed. The potential economic benefits 
garnered from either property-rights based management program 
would be greatest (on a percentage basis) if catch rates were 
roughly 50% of 1987-1991 levels, as less efficient vessels would 
essentially be forced to leave the fishery.
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ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC 
SEA SCALLOP PLACOPECTEN MAGELLANICUS FISHERY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS, TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS AND FISHING EFFORT
INTRODUCTION
Fishery Management 
Fishery management in the United States has historically 
emphasized resource conservation. However, management that 
protects resource stocks by focusing primarily on the resource or 
on purely biological objectives creates a potential problem -- 
society may not obtain the maximum net benefits from the 
exploitation and utilization of the resource.
Likewise, managers and researchers have given extensive 
attention to resolving the open access/common property problem 
identified by Warming (1911) and Gordon (1954). In an open 
access/common property fishery, the resource is public and 
accessible to all whom are properly licensed. Neither fishermen 
nor managers have property rights to the resource. As a result, 
the number of vessels in the fishery frequently expands until 
overcapitalization ensues, economic rent (profit) is dissipated, 
and society may not realize maximum benefits from the resource.
Through the 1950s, 60s, 70s and early 1980s, many resource 
managers and researchers suggested that limited entry or 
controlled access management programs appeared to best address 
the problems caused by overcapitalization (Gordon, 1954; Rettig 
and Ginter, 1978; Sissewine and Kirkley, 1982). However, 
Crutchfield (1979) demonstrated that many controlled access 
management programs would not likely prevent overcapitalization.
2
3Capital stuffing (the unnecessary expansion of inputs in order to 
increase catch capability) would probably still occur. Anderson 
(1991) and Neher et al. (1989) have subsequently argued that
achieving maximum net benefits from fishery resources requires a 
solution of the open-access/common property problem.
Most management programs in existence now do not address the 
open access problem and instead focus on resource conservation.
A common regulatory approach is to limit overall fishing effort 
(input). Non-transferable effort (NTE) regulations control the 
inputs that are utilized by fishermen towards catching a fish 
stock. For example, NTEs might limit the input of allowable days 
at sea (effort quota) of a fisherman's vessel during a season. 
Unfortunately, capital stuffing in the form of increased 
efficiency often occurs and defeats the intended effort control 
(Dupont, 1991) .
Another widely used regulation establishes a quota on the 
total amount of harvest in a fishery during a season. Under a 
quota program, the fishery is closed when the pre-established 
quota is caught. Unfortunately, a race to fish often occurs when 
a season's fishery is opened. This race to fish encourages 
capital stuffing and excessive fishery effort resulting in 
increased cost per unit of effort, large price swings in the 
target species, and major safety problems (Scott, 1988; 
Crutchfield, 1979) .
Trip limits restrict the poundage a vessel may harvest 
during an individual trip. Although intended to distribute catch
4more evenly over a season, trip limits rarely prevent fishery 
closure and often increase per-unit harvesting costs even when 
used in conjunction with an overall quota (Sissenwine & Kirkley, 
1980; Kirkley and Dupaul, 1990).
Other approaches use taxes as a regulative device. By using 
input and/or output taxes, managers attempt to discourage fishing 
effort and total catch respectively. These approaches require 
legislation, increased management flexibility, and greater 
administrative and enforcement costs (Sissenwine and Kirkley,
1980) .
Controlling access to the fishery is a managerial method 
that was once considered a cure-all to fisheries (Rettig, 1984). 
For example, by establishing a maximum allowable number of 
vessels in the fishery, managers hope to reduce or maintain the 
total harvest of the fleet. Once again, by itself, limited entry 
does not prevent capital stuffing (Crutchfield, 1979).
In an open access fishery, the preceding regulatory devices 
do not create sufficient managerial control to prevent 
overcapitalization. Alternative managerial approaches attempt to 
alleviate the problems associated with overcapitalization by 
establishing limited ownership, or property rights, in the 
resource.
One potential property-right technique used in management of 
some fisheries throughout the world is the individual 
transferable quota (ITQ). ITQs were initially proposed by Dales 
(1968) as a method of pollution control. Under Dales' proposal,
5individual industrial sites were allowed to release a set amount 
of pollution over a certain time period. When a factory neared 
its quota, it could attempt to purchase rights (to pollute) from 
another factory. Thus, the total amount of pollution was limited 
(assuming compliance), yet quota (right to pollute) was available 
to all on the open market. Later, Christy (1973) proposed ITQs 
as a possible managerial technique for fisheries.
In an ITQ program, a total allowable catch (TAC) is set for 
the fishery over a specific period of time (season) and a fixed 
number of fishermen is allocated rights to the fishery. During 
the season, renting, leasing or selling of exclusive rights to 
the TAC is allowed between fishermen. The price of these rights 
is generated by market forces to reflect the full difference 
between the aggregate minimum catching costs and the price of the 
end product. At this price, the fisherman will either demand or 
offer rights depending upon whether his/her projected net income 
from the catch is greater or less than the price of the rights 
(Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Sissenwine and Mace, 1992). As a 
result, quota will eventually fall into the hands of the most 
cost-efficient vessels. Through this mechanism, rent of the 
remaining vessels increases via greater returns per unit of 
effort as redundant costs exhibited by overcapitalization are 
eliminated (Clark et al., 1988; Geen and Nayer, 1988; Dewees, 
1989) .
Another managerial approach using property rights is based 
upon individual transferable effort (ITE). Like NTE-oriented
6techniques, ITE programs attempt to restrict the input (fishing 
effort) into a fishery in order to reduce output (total catch). 
However, ITEs permit the trading of the rights to a certain 
amount of regulated effort such as allowable time at sea. For 
example, an ITE program might assign 100 days of fishing effort 
to each vessel in a particular fishery over a season. If one 
vessel uses all of its allotted time at sea, it may attempt to 
purchase quota (effort) from another vessel in the fishery. The 
potential seller of quota would likely sell quota if the quota 
price is equal to or below his/her costs. Therefore, market 
forces theoretically cause ITEs to flow to the most efficient 
vessel operators.
NTEs, ITQs, and ITEs represent three alternative approaches 
to the management of a fishery. Yet, only one, or a combination 
of these, may govern a fishery at a time. So, which of these 
approaches would most effectively manage open access/common 
property resources?
The Placovecten Magellanicus Fishery
The U.S. Atlantic sea scallop (Placopecten magellanicus) 
fishery was an open access/common property resource that is 
considered to be overcapitalized and its stock viability 
threatened (New England Fishery Management Council, 1982, 1993) . 
From 1982 to March 1, 1994, the fishery was regulated by age-at- 
entry restrictions under the Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic 
Sea Scallops. Each vessel's average meat count per trip had to
7equal no more than 3 0 meats per pound per trip + 10% tolerance; a 
seasonal adjustment was also allowed (33 m.p.p. + 10% tolerance).
For vessels landing shell stock, shell size had to be greater 
than or equal to 3.5 inches. Violators faced monetary penalties 
and/or catch forfeitures. Theoretically, therefore, minimum 
average harvest size was ensured under the meat count regulation. 
Unfortunately, extensive analyses and stock assessments suggested 
that the age-at-entry restrictions did not adequately control 
either juvenile or total mortality (N.E.F.M.C., 1992).
After several years of study and public comment, the New 
England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) proposed to regulate 
the fishery through NTE and several other constraints. Effective 
March 1, 1994, Amendment 4 to the Fishery Management Plan 
restricts the number of vessels (moratorium), controls the annual 
number of fishing days per vessel, limits crew size and gear, and 
requires a vessel tracking system.
In theory, to achieve success, a fishery's management plan 
must control all components of effort, many of which are ill- 
defined or not easily measured. Sissenwine and Kirkley (1982) 
have shown, however, that these effort controls may not 
adequately control fishing mortality. For example, determined 
fishermen will likely seek alternative input-augmenting 
technology (changes in gear or fishing technique) that may 
increase or maintain harvest levels. Moreover, identification 
and subsequent regulation of all inputs leads to dissipation of 
economic rents, as well as technical and economic inefficiency
8(Anderson, 1991). The primarily single-species, single-gear 
Placopecten magellanicus fishery is considered by some a good 
candidate for an ITQ program rather than an effort control (NTE) 
program (Sutinen et al. 19 92) .
Given that effort controls are currently being used in the 
sea scallop fishery, a comparative economic analysis of NTEs, 
ITEs, and ITQs would provide important information for 
alternative management of the sea scallop fishery. This study 
examines the underlying economic ramifications of ITQ- versus 
ITE- versus NTE-management programs. It is hypothesized that 
ITQs offer the maximum net return per vessel over the aggregate 
fleet.
Net returns from the three potential regulatory programs are 
assessed by using linear programming models of costs and earnings 
and statistical models of the marketplace. In addition, critical 
transferable quota (catch and effort) market prices are estimated 
using a panel data sample of vessels. In order to determine 
these equilibrium market prices, market demand for tradable quota 
and effort are estimated. Estimation is calculated by Tobin's 
estimation procedures for censored data (aggregated over all 
individual demand values). By setting the aggregate demand equal 
to the aggregate supply of quota or effort, market equilibrium 
price for quota and effort is determined.
INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND/FISHERY PROBLEMS
Industrial Background 
The Atlantic sea scallop fishery is one of the largest 
commercial marine activities along the East Coast of the United 
States. Productive fishing grounds extend from Virginia to 
Canada in water depths generally in excess of twenty fathoms.
The most prominent scallop vessel ports include New Bedford, MA, 
Cape May, NJ, and Hampton/Newport News, VA. In 1990, the fleet 
of about 500 vessels landed over 40 million pounds of sea scallop 
valued in excess of $150 million, making the fishery the sixth 
largest in the United States by value (Sutinen et al., 1992).
Its economic well-being ensures the existence of numerous jobs 
from boat captains and crewmen to processors and truck drivers, 
and contributes to the prosperity of local economies.
Throughout the recorded history of the Atlantic scallop 
fishery, a boom-bust pattern of landings has been exhibited. In 
1982, the New England Fishery Management Council in consultation 
with the Mid- and South-Atlantic Fishery Councils created the 
Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Sea Scallop to manage the 
fishery. Since that time, the fishery has been primarily 
regulated by an average meat count regime (N.E.F.M.C., 1982) .
From 1970 to 1990, landings increased over 600% as effort 
expanded nearly 800% (figure 1). From 1988 to 1992, scallop
9
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catches were at historically high levels. However, the bulk of 
the harvestable stock was new recruits (3- to 4-year-old 
scallops). Since crossing the defined overfishing threshold in 
mid-1986, the fishery has approached catch levels that are nearly 
double the acceptable fishing mortality rate (figure 2). 
(Overfishing, as defined by the NEFMC plan development team is 
the fishing mortality rate that, if continued, results in a 
spawning stock biomass of five percent of the maximum spawning 
potential (MSP) (N.E.F.M.C., 1993). Relatively high rates of 
recruitment and elevated rates of fishing mortality appear to 
have been the*- primary causes of this new recruit dependence 
(Sutinen et al., 1992). Fishing effort and mortality were 
clearly excessive (N.E.F.M.C., 1992).
Figure 1. Landings and fishing effort (days fished) of Atlantic sea 
scallops, 1960-1991 (Wigley and Serchuk 1992).
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Figure 2. Composite fishing mortality on Atlantic sea scallops for 
Delmarva, South Channel, and Southeast Georges Bank, 1982-1990. Mean 
fishing mortality is weighted by landings from each resource sub-area
(N.M.F.S. , 1992) .
3.0
2.5 -
Weighted Mean 
80% Confidence Limits
5 1.5 -
y/.
Definition
0.5 -
1982 1983 1984
T ------------1------------- r
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
During 1993, abundance surveys indicated that the overall 
biomass of harvestable scallops approached an all-time low. 
Likewise, catch rates by scallop vessels plummeted. As of Fall, 
1993, the level of harvest was roughly 50% of 1992 landings 
(National Marine Fisheries Service, 1992).
The current scallop supply constraint causes many problems 
from a business perspective. First, wholesalers and processors 
have difficulty guaranteeing buyers sufficient quantities of 
larger scallops. As a result, buyers may opt to purchase the 
smaller, but more abundant bay or imported scallop. Second, at
12
current retail prices ($8-$9/pound), many consumers will choose 
cheaper alternative seafood. The less expensive bay scallop may 
take market share from the sea scallop. Already, one of the 
largest seafood restaurant chains in the United States, Red 
Lobster, has ceased purchasing sea scallops in favor of imported 
Chinese bay scallops. From a marketing perspective, once 
established sea scallop markets are lost, they may be very 
difficult to regain, regardless of future scallop abundance and 
price levels.
The Open Access / Common Property Problem
The meat count regulation and other past management 
approaches have failed to adequately acknowledge the basis of the 
problems within the fishery (N.E.F.M.C., 1993). Prior to 
Amendment 4, the Atlantic sea scallop fishery was an open 
access/common property fishery -- no prior regulations governed 
the entrance of vessels (effort) into the fishery. Over the past 
decade, numerous fishermen entered the seemingly profitable 
scallop fishery, lured by the success of established fishermen. 
Eventually, this glut of scallop vessels created an 
overcapitalized fishery.
In an open access/common property environment, sea scallops 
are readily accessible and available to anyone with a vessel and 
gear. The scallop fisherman has no property rights to a portion 
of the potential catch or the ocean floor upon which it resides. 
This is a classic situation for the occurrence of
13
overcapitalization as described by Gordon (1954) and Scott 
(1988).
In an overcapitalized sea scallop fishery, overall rent 
(profit) to the vessels within the fishery will be driven to zero 
over the long run. As demonstrated in figure 3, with the 
uncontrolled expansion of effort, total revenue will equal total 
costs over the long run. However, if effort is reduced, rent 
(profit) of the fleet increases and is maximized at effort=Y{.
Figure 3. Fleet Rent At Varying Effort
$
TC
TR
o
EFFORT
TR =  Total Revenue 
TC =  Total Costs 
Y =  Effort
A similar scenario was exemplified nearly two decades ago by 
the thousands of lobster traps placed virtually on top of one 
another in the New England area (Fullenbaum and Bell, 1974). Not 
only did these traps catch an excessive amount of available 
lobsters, but also they were redundant -- the fishery could have 
caught the same number of lobsters with just a fraction of the 
number of traps, and thereby decreased total costs and raised 
rent within the fishery.
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Another major problem in an open access/common property 
resource can arise when the population of a particular fishery 
decreases to dangerously low levels. As fish stocks decrease, 
market price per unit of the resource may soar on account of 
basic supply and demand. Supply limitations may cause increased 
pressure by fishermen, who are essentially in search of a lucky, 
but profitable catch (Crutchfield, 1979).
This scenario is exemplified by the current North Atlantic 
bluefin tuna fishery which was open access for many years. Since 
the 1970's, the stock of spawning-sized bluefins has become 
smaller and smaller because of overfishing (N.M.F.S., 1989) . The 
current spawning stock is assessed at only twenty percent of its 
1970 levels. As a result of increasing demand for bluefin by the 
Japanese sushi/sashami market and decreasing supply of available 
fish, a single half-ton giant bluefin tuna can sell in excess of 
$30,000. Though such exorbitant prices may benefit a few 
fishermen in the short run, no one will benefit in the long run 
if the bluefin is fished to extinction.
Under previous management of the Placopecten magellanicus, 
even if the optimal amount and age of scallops that should have 
been landed from a biological and economic standpoint and the 
optimal level of fishing effort that should have been exerted to 
land that catch were known, the fishery manager could not have 
limited the numbers of vessels attempting to exploit the 
resource. In the short run, this is acceptable assuming that 
scallops are abundant (perhaps as evidenced by a lack of pressure
15
to change past management practices in the scallop fishery). 
However, in the long run, when a fishery becomes overcapitalized, 
a lack of managerial power generally results in shrinking profits 
to each vessel. Eventually, net return (total revenue minus 
total costs) will contract to zero as evidenced by recent 
problems within the fishery. Thus, the scallop fishery clearly 
needs a viable solution to the problem posed by this threatened 
resource and the overcapitalized fleet that exploits it.
Proposed Regulations
In response to the numerous problems confronting the scallop 
fishery, NEFMC has proposed new regulations. Amendment 4 to the 
Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Sea Scallop recommends a 
number of controls which include NTE limitations and additional 
regulations:
1. Moratorium. Restricts limited access fishing permits to 
vessels already in the fishery. No other vessels may 
land scallop meats in excess of 400 pounds or 50 U.S. 
bushels within a 24-hour period.
2. Vessel, operator, and dealer permits. Mandates limited 
access permits to the vessels, vessel operators, and 
dealers.
3. Effort reduction program. Restricts the number of days 
that vessels may spend at sea. Allowable days-at-sea 
varies according to occasional, part-time, or full-time 
vessel classification and decreases significantly through
the year 2000. Adjustments of effort (increases or 
decreases) may be made by the NEFMC in years three and 
six of the plan.
4. Group assignment corrections. Allows for appeals.
5. Supplementary measures. Designed to limit a vessel's 
production capability.
A. Crew Size. Crew size is limited to nine crew members.
B. Shucking and sorting machines. Shucking and sorting 
machines are prohibited aboard vessels possessing 400 
pounds or 50 bushels of scallops while at sea.
C. 3 1/2 inch minimum shell height. Shell stockers are 
subject to the current 3 1/2 inch minimum shell height 
standard.
D. 400 pounds trip limit for non-qualifying vessels. 
Non-qualifying vessels are restricted to 400 pounds or 
50 bushels of scallop as a by-catch.
E. Dredge restrictions. Escapement of small scallops and 
by-catch is enhanced.
1. 3 1/4 inch minimum ring size in year one and two.
2. 3 1/2 inch minimum ring size beginning year three.
3. 3 0 feet limit on the total width of all dredges.
4. Prohibition on chafing gear, cookies, more than 
double linking, or other obstructing devices.
5. 5 1/2 inch minimum mesh twine top.
F. Trawl restrictions. Escapement of small scallops and 
by-catch is enhanced.
1. 5 1/2 inch minimum mesh.
2. 144 feet trawl sweep limit.
G. Data reporting. Participation in a data collection 
and monitoring system is mandatory by all domestic 
vessels and dealers.
H. Effort monitoring. Full-time and part-time vessels 
are required to utilize a transponder (vessel tracking 
system) at all times. Occasional vessels must comply 
with a telephone call-in system.
I. Penalties. Penalties for violations of the preceding 
regulations may result in fines up to $100,000.00 and 
permanent revocation of permit.
Unfortunately, these proposed limits on vessel inputs into 
the fishery may not optimize future scallop catches or convey 
maximum benefits to society. Limiting the allowable days at sea 
could result in capital stuffing (Crutchfield, 1979). Under a 
days at sea constraint, the average vessel operator would attempt 
to catch as many scallops as possible during the limited 
available time. To accomplish this goal, the typical owner would 
invest more capital into the vessel to make it capable of 
catching more scallops in a shorter period of time. Such 
modifications would increase average costs, thereby decreasing 
overall rent earned by the owner and operator. Already, prior to 
the introduction of Amendment 4, some vessel operators installed 
devices such as remote rudder controls and remote dredge 
operation capability to increase efficiency.
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In addition, days-at-sea are to be substantially reduced 
over a seven year period. As a result, changes in days-at-sea 
are likely to significantly affect rent earned by vessels.
METHODOLOGY
NTE-, ITE- And ITQ- regulations are inherently different 
approaches to managing the sea scallop fishery. Each differs in 
probable economic impact upon the fishery. As a result, a 
comparative economic analysis would produce data essential to the 
potential adoption of any one, or combination, of these 
prospective management programs.
Net economic returns from each regulatory system are 
estimated through linear programming (LP) models of a panel data 
sample of nine vessels within the fishery. These vessels are of 
varying length, gross tonnage, horsepower, age and overall 
technology. The LP models are derived from actual costs and 
earnings of these vessels over a five year period from 1987 to 
1991.
Predicted short-run equilibrium market prices per unit of 
quota (days at sea or landings) are estimated for each management 
program at varying levels of quota supplied, following open 
market trade amongst all vessels in the fleet. These quota 
prices are considered an annual rental or lease price that 
vessels would charge one another when trading quota. Since these 
equilibrium market prices require an estimate of market demand 
for tradable quota, which in some cases may be zero, demand is 
estimated by utilizing Tobin's censored regression technique.
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Tobin's technique simply recognizes that these values of quota 
price must be greater than or equal to zero, because if a 
vessel's demand is less than zero, it would be willing to pay 
$0.00 for quota.
First, rental/lease prices for quota (shadow values) by 
vessel are determined by the respective LP model. Next, these 
values along with their corresponding quota amounts are regressed 
utilizing Tobin's technique, thereby forming an inverse derived 
demand function for each vessel. Through the summation of all 
vessels' demand functions, an aggregate inverse demand curve for 
the fleet is estimated. Finally, resulting equilibrium market 
prices at varying quota levels are calculated where the aggregate 
inverse demand curve and the quota supplied curve intersect.
Additionally, fleet rent gains from trade (under ITE and ITQ 
programs) are estimated. These rent gains occur as vessels trade 
quota allocations, y, between one another to maximize short-term, 
individual vessel rent. When less efficient vessels trade quota 
to more efficient vessels, economic rents are theoretically 
maximized. Total fleet gains in rent equal the difference 
between total fleet rent after trade and total fleet rent before 
trade.
Linear Programming Models 
Linear programming allows optimization (maximization or 
minimization) through the manipulation of inequality constraints 
in the form of G(x,y)  ^ C or G(x,y) > C, rather than G(x,y) = C
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as in classical optimization. Such constraints more closely 
mirror actual markets, since they allow a consumer (or end user) 
to choose any amount up to the limited amount available. Also, 
linear programming is more easily understood and accepted than 
other simulation methods by resource managers and industry 
members (Squires and Kirkley, In press).
A linear programming model of NTE and ITE regulatory 
programs is specified with the objective of maximizing short-run 
rent of the sample vessels. The model subjects these vessels to 
input-oriented constraints on total allowable days-at-sea and 
crew size, and a set of standard non-negativity constraints which 
simply indicate to the model that a vessel cannot fish a negative 
number of days per year. These constraints attempt to mirror the 
restrictions designated by Amendment 4 to the Fishery Management 
Plan. The following model is designated for each of the vessels:
NTE / ITE model: Max II = Em(Dm(PmAm - VCJ )
Subject to: 1. £Dm < DAS
2. Dm < D-5
3. Crew Size s 4
4. Crew Size 9
5. Dm > 0
II = Profit per year
Dm = Days fished in month m
Pm = Average ex-vessel price per pound for month m
Am = Average daily catch in pounds per day for month m
VCm = Average daily variable costs for month m
DAS = Total allowable days at sea
D = Number of days in month m
The maximum number of days-at-sea per month is set equal to 
(D-5) to account for layover days, vessel repairs, inclement
weather, and other events that inevitably reduce available 
fishing capability. Minimum crew size to operate a vessel is set 
equal to four to reflect of safety concerns and current fishing
techniques and essential levels of inputs.
Similarly, the following linear programming model maximizes 
the short-run rent of each of the vessels within an ITQ 
regulatory program. The model subjects each vessel to the 
output-oriented constraint of a total allowable catch, in 
addition to crew size and standard non-negativity constraints.
The following model is designated for each of the vessels:
ITQ Model: Max II = Em(Dm(PmAm - VCm) )
Sub j ect to: 1. 'EDmAm < y
2. Dm < D-5
3. Crew Size > 4
4. Crew Size  ^ 9
5. Dm > 0
II = Profit per year
Dm = Days fished in month m
Pm = Average price for month m
Am = Average daily catch in pounds per day for month m
VCm = Average daily variable costs for month m
y = Total allowable catch (per vessel)
D = Number of days in month m
Both linear programming models assume short run static 
equilibrium and externally determined fixed input cost and 
scallop price (Squires and Kirkley, In press). Within the ITQ 
program, supply of individual vessel quota (via quota allocation) 
is determined from historical catch data extracted from trip 
settlements; vessels that caught more scallops per unit effort 
(i.e. pounds per day) are allocated a greater amount of initial
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quota.
Coefficients within the LP reflect the different costs, 
revenue, and overall technology of the individual vessels within 
the fleet. These coefficients are derived from trip settlements 
and are comprised of variable crew costs, variable owner's costs, 
quasi-fixed costs, average scallop price per pound, average 
pounds caught per day, average crew size, and additional revenue 
(e.g. shack) . The following are considered variable crew costs: 
crew insurance, electric, fuel, oil, ice, food, captain's bonus, 
mate's bonus, other crew bonuses, crew supplies, settlement fee, 
and other miscellaneous costs. The following are deemed variable 
owner costs: maintenance and repair, insurance, owner's supplies, 
and other miscellaneous costs. Finally, the following are 
considered (quasi) fixed costs: vessel opportunity cost (@ 9% 
annually) , vessel depreciation (over 12 years), and captain and 
crew opportunity costs.
Under NTE, ITE, and ITQ programs, demand by individual 
vessels for supplied quota of either days-at-sea or catch quota 
is derived from each vessel's costs and production technology and 
is designated derived demand (Squires, 1990) . Solutions to the 
preceding LP models (maximization of II) yield a unit quota rent, 
t, that measures a vessel's implicit marginal valuation of quota 
(the increase in profit with a one unit increase in the quota 
constraint). The unit quota rent is represented by a shadow 
(dual) value of the quota constraint (i.e. the amount by which 
rent changes for a one unit increase in the binding constraint).
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Inverse Derived Demand For Quota 
As detailed by Squires and Kirkley (In press), and 
Lanfersieck and Squires, 1992, the linear programming model 
initially estimates the shadow prices, t, for separate vessel 
quotas, y. Then, each vessel's inverse derived demand (where 
price .is a function of quantity demanded and other exogenous 
factors) for quota is estimated by regressing t upon the vessel's 
quota, y and dummy variables (which represent monthly 
differences) using Tobin's censored regression technique. Then, 
through the summation of all of the sample vessels' derived 
demand for quota, an overall market demand for quota can be 
estimated under the respective management program (figure 4).
Figure 4. Aggregate Derived Demand (D) 
PRICE
o
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)
Next, as detailed further by Squires and Kirkley (In press) 
and Lanfersieck and Squires (19 92), assuming that all quota may 
be freely exchanged on the open market, the equilibrium market
price for quota, P, is estimated. This price is determined by 
the intersection of the fleet's aggregate derived demand curve 
and the quota supply curve (i.e. the point at which demand equals 
supply) . The expected NTE/ITE price is estimated by the 
intersection of the aggregate derived demand curve and allowable 
days-at-sea supplied, while the expected ITQ price is determined 
by the intersection of the aggregate derived demand curve and 
different levels of total allowable catch supplied (figure 5).
Figure 5. Equilibrium Market Price (P) 
At Quota * Y
PRICE
p
o Y
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)
Then, as illustrated by figure 6, as the quota supplied is 
varied in the model as a percentage of the current production 
level, the equilibrium market price is predicted at different 
levels of initial quota allotment (100%, 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 50%, 
40%, 30%, 25%). Once again, the expected NTE, ITE, and ITQ 
prices are determined by the intersection of the aggregate 
derived demand curve and varying levels of allowable days-at-sea
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and total allowable catch.
Figure 6. Equilibrium Market Price 
At Varying Quota Amounts
PRICE
o
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)
Sensitivity of the unit quota rent equilibrium market price 
to changes in the ex-vessel price of scallops is estimated by 
calculating the difference between the unit quota rent for a 
particular LP model at actual 1987-91 ex-vessel prices and the 
unit quota rent at ex-vessel prices 1% greater than 1987-91 
amounts. The percentage difference between the two calculated 
unit quota rent figures represents the likely percentage change 
in equilibrium market price for unit quota rent following a 1% 
increase in ex-vessel scallop price.
Rent Gains From Trade 
Next, rent gains from trade are estimated. Gains in rent 
can occur in ITE and ITQ programs when vessels exchange quota in 
order to maximize short-run profits (via adjusted production and
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quota holdings). As shown by Squires and Kirkley (In press), and 
Lanfersieck and Squires, 19 92, the total industry gains from 
trade of quota at the equilibrium market price are equivalent to 
the difference between total industry rent before trade and the 
total industry rent after trade under respective management 
programs. The following example illustrates the process of quota 
exchange between two vessels.
While the price received per pound of scallop is determined 
exogenously, marginal cost (MC) (the increase in cost for a one 
unit increase in output) varies with level of quota held (figure 
7) .
Figure 7. Marginal Cost Curve (MC) 
PRICE
MC
0
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)
Rent (profit) for a vessel with a demand curve, D, and 
marginal cost curve, MC, at quota level=Y is illustrated in 
figure 8. Likewise, MC varies between vessels. For example, 
figure 9 illustrates 2 vessels that comprise a fleet with the MC
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(supply) curves of MCt and MC2:
In figure 9, vessel 2 is the more efficient vessel, as its 
profit per unit of quota is larger (remember, I I  [profit] =
Revenue - Cost). Therefore, following initial distribution of 
quota, vessel 2 would value quota at a greater price per unit of 
quota than vessel 1. Therefore, assuming vessel operators want 
to maximize profits, at the established quota, Y, vessel 2 will
Figure 8. Vessel Rent
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o
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)
Figure 9. Marginal Cost Curves
PRICE
MC
MC
MC*
MC
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)
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demand quota, while vessel 1 is willing to supply quota. As 
vessel 1 trades quota to vessel 2, MC2 increases while MC^  
decreases. Trading will cease once H  = H2 (profit, and 
subsequently MCs, are equal). As a result, vessel 2 increases 
its quota holding to y2, while vessel 1 decreases its holdings to 
Yi-
Such quota exchange amongst vessels creates gains from trade 
due to an overall reduction in production costs, while aggregate 
quota remains unchanged. Economic rents are maximized and gains 
in trade realized as less efficient vessels trade quota to more 
efficient vessels.
RESULTS
Inverse Derived Demand for Quota
Both the effort-regulated (NTE and ITE) LP model and the 
landings-regulated (ITQ) LP model were run nine times for each 
vessel at varying percentages of total allowable quota supplied 
(range of 100% to 25%). Initial quota (i.e. 100% level) was set 
equal to the aggregate fleet average for the five year period 
(1987-1991). As a result, each model generated nine pairs of 
quota quantities and subsequent prices (unit quota rent, t) for 
assessing the demand for quota. These data were then used to 
estimate inverse demand functions of each vessel using Tobin's 
regression technique. Again, Tobin's technique was necessary 
since quota values were censored greater than or equal to $0.00 
per unit.
The individual demand functions across the sample fleet were 
summed and an aggregate inverse derived demand function of the 
fleet was also derived. Individual vessel demand for effort and 
landings quota varied significantly between vessels as depicted 
by the results of the regression for the NTE/ITE model and the 
ITQ model in tables 1 and 2.
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Table 1. Inverse Derived Demand Functions 
(NTE/ITE Model)
Vessel Quota Price Demand Function (y-Quota
A PA - (-5.09627)(y) ♦ 918
B PB - (-4.79334)(y) ♦ 996
C PC - (-4.43651)(y) ♦ 918
D PD - (-4.31867)(y) ♦ 1266
E PE - (-4 .8 4 3 2 1)(y) ♦ 1167
F PF - (-4.75990)(y) ♦ 1123
G PG - (-6.55204)(y) ♦ 1701
H PH - (-5.61005)(y) ♦ 1740
I PI - (-3.47283)(y) ♦ 788
Aggregate P 
T-Ratio 
Sig. Level
(-5.44379)(y)
-10.08
0.00
1239
14.19
0.00
Table 2. Inverse Derived Demand Functions 
(ITQ Model)
Vessel Quota Price Demand Function (y-Quo a Supplied)
A PA « (-11.2710 X 10E-6)(y) 1.3985
B PB - (-13.3374 X 10E-6)(y) 1.7661
C PC - (-10.2401 X 10E-6)(y) 1.4224
D PD - ( -8 .2155 X 10E-6)(y) 1.6836
E PE ■ ( -9 .2636 X 10E-6)(y) 1.6139
F PF • ( -9.6273 X 10E-6)(y) 1.5510
G PG « ( -9 .5859 X 10E-6)(y) 2.1430
H PH « ( -2.7111 X 10E-6)(y) 1.7134
I PI ■ ( -8.6181 X 10E-6)(y) 1.2210
Aggregate P ■ ( -6.9211 X 10E-6)(y) ♦ 1.41384
T -Ratio ■ -5 .89 10.20
Sig. Level ■ 0.00 0.00
Fleet Rents Before Trade 
Total fleet rents before trade were estimated by summing the 
rents of individual vessels at varying levels of quota supplied. 
Disparity in estimated fleet rent before trade at the initial 
quota allocation was the result of differences between the 
NTE/ITE model and the ITQ model. Negative amounts are in 
parentheses.
Table 3. Fleet Rents Before Trade 
(NTE/ITE Model)
Quota Equivalent Fleet
Allocated Days Rent
Initial 255.6 $417,022
90% of Initial 230.0 $397,849
80% of Initial 204.5 $359,207
70% of Initial 178.9 $293,408
60% of Initial 153.4 $195,980
50% of Initial 127.8 $70,414
40% of Initial 102.2 ($70,306)
30% of Initial 76.7 ($267,970)
25% of Initial 63.9 ($330,791)
* Equivalent days and landings are per vessel
Table 4. Fleet Rents Before Trade 
(ITQ Model)
Quota Equivalent Fleet
Allocated Landings Rent
Initial 145,706 $407,051
90% of Initial 131,136 $359,056
80% of Initial 116,565 $279,260
70% of Initial 101,940 $180,891
60% of Initial 87,424 $58,258
50% of Initial 72,853 ($79,316)
40% of Initial 58,283 ($205,459)
30% of Initial 43,712 ($364,921)
25% of Initial 36,427 ($461,167)
Equivalent days and landings are per vessel
Equilibrium Market Price 
Equilibrium market price at varying levels of quota supplied 
was estimated for the ITE and ITQ models by solving for the 
intersection of the aggregate inverse demand function, D, and the 
aggregate quota supplied to the fleet, Y. Each vessels' initial 
quota allocation was set equal to the average number of days-at- 
sea (NTE/ITE model) and average landings in pounds (ITQ model) 
for the sample fleet over the 1987-91 period. Tables 5 and 6 and 
figures 10 and 11 depict the resultant equilibrium prices at 
varying percentages of initial quota allocated.
Table 5. Equilibrium Market Price 
(NTE/ITE Model -  After Trade)
Quota Equivalent Average Resulting
Allocated Days at Sea Market Price
Initial 266.6 $0.00
90% of Initial 230.0 $0.00
80% of Initial 204.6 $160.30
70% of Initial 178.9 $289.90
60% of Initial 153.4 $410.80
60% of Initial 127.8 $532.10
40% of Initial 102.2 $653.60
30% of Initial 76.7 $774.50
26% of Initial 63.9 $843.60
* Equivalent days at sea are per vessel
Figure 10. Equilibrium Market Price 
(NTE/ITE Model)
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Table 6. Equilibrium Market Price 
(ITQ Model -  After Trade)
Quota Equivalent Average Resulting
Allocated Landings (lbs.) Market Price
Initial 145,706 $0.00
90% of Initial 131,136 $0.3521
80% of Initial 116,565 $0.6297
70% of Initial 101,994 $0.6906
60% of Initial 87,424 $0.8514
50% of Initial 72,853 $1.0123
40% of Initial 58,283 $1.1732
30% of Initial 43,712 $1.3087
25% of Initial 36,427 $1.3702
• Equivalent landings are per vessel
Figure 11. Equilibrium Market Price 
(ITQ Model)
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Unit quota rent equilibrium market price sensitivity to 
changes in ex-vessel price due to increases or decreases in 
landings or imports is illustrated in figure 7. Price 
sensitivity indicates the percentage change in unit quota rent 
resulting from a 1% increase in ex-vessel price. For example,
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the initial level of quota allocation, if ex-vessel price 
increased by 1%, equilibrium market price for unit quota rent 
would increase approximately 9.05%. Conversely, lower ex-vessel 
prices would result in lower unit quota rent prices.
Table 7. Estimated Unit Quota Rent Sensitivity To 
Changes In Domestic Landings And Imports
Quota Nominal Dollar Equivalent Price
Allocation Change Sensitivity
Initial $0.0192 9.05%
90% of Initial $0.0271 7.24%
80% of Initial $0.0413 6.32%
70% of Initial $0.0394 5.23%
60% of Initial $0.0386 4.10%
50% of Initial $0.0352 3.48%
40% of Initial $0.0371 3.30%
30% of Initial $0.0364 3.14%
25% of Initial $0.0367 3.07%
* Price Sensitivity ind ica tes th e  p e rc e n ta g e  c h a n g e  in unit q u o ta  ren t 
resulting  from a  1% in c rea se  in ex -vesse l p rice
Fleet Rents After Trade 
Total fleet rents after trade were estimated by first 
simulating an open trade market between the nine vessels at each 
level of quota allocation. This simulation was created within a 
BASIC computer routine that analyzed each individual vessel's 
inverse demand for quota subject to a constraint on the total 
landings and days-at-sea capability of each vessel during a year. 
The total landings capability of each respective vessel is the 
amount where marginal revenue, (averaged over the five year 
experimental period) equalled marginal costs (over the same 
period) . Likewise, the days-at-sea capability was approximated
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where scallop price (P) = MC, subject to an overriding limit of 
3 05 days (five layover days per month were set aside for bad 
weather, vessel repairs, etc.)
Next, the computer routine adjusted the days-at-sea quota 
(ITE model) and landings quota (ITQ model) of each vessel until 
marginal rent per unit of quota was equal across the fleet within 
each model. The resulting quota amounts per vessel were then 
reemployed in the respective LP model to estimate rent for each 
vessel. Finally, these rents were aggregated across the fleet at 
each quota level to produce a fleet rent after trade.
Table 8 illustrates each quota allocation for the ITE model, 
equivalent average days-at-sea per vessel, subsequent fleet 
landings as predicted by the model, fleet rents before and after 
trade, as well as the resulting gains from trade. Table 9 
depicts the ITQ model's quota allocation, average landings per 
vessel, fleet rents before and after trade, and resulting gains 
from trade.
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Table 8. Fleet Rents After Trade 
(ITE Model)
Quota Equivalent Predicted Rent Before Rent After Rent Gains % Gains
Allocated Days Landings Trade Trade From Trade From Trade
Initial 255.6 1,263,357 $417,022 $418,272 $1,250 0.30%
90% of Initial 230.0 1,263,357 $397,849 $418,272 $20,423 5.13%
80% of Initial 204.5 1,172,742 $359,207 $392,078 $32,871 9.15%
70% of Initial 178.9 1,064,875 $293,408 $344,005 $50,597 17.24%
60% of Initial 153.4 949,291 $195,980 $263,670 $67,690 34.54%
50% of Initial 127.8 811,082 $70,414 $144,724 $74,310 105.53%
40% of Initial 102.2 666,785 ($70,306) ($893) $69,413 98.73%
30% of Initial 76.7 515,130 ($267,970) ($165,316) $102,654 38.31%
25% of Initial 63.9 433,997 ($330,791) ($258,222) $72,569 21.94%
* Predicted landings are aggregate fleet amounts
Table 9. Fleet Rents After Trade 
(ITQ Model)
Quota Equivalent Rent Before Rent After Rent Gains % Gains
Allocated Landings Trade Trade From Trade From Trade
Initial 145,706 $407,051 $418,272 $11,221 2.76%
90% of Initial 131,136 $359,056 $394,554 $35,498 9.89%
80% of Initial 116,565 $279,260 $331,482 $52,222 18.70%
70% of Initial 101,994 $180,891 $242,340 $61,449 33.97%
60% of Initial 87,424 $68,258 $128,988 $60,730 88.97%
50% of Initial 72,853 ($79,316) ($3,170) $76,146 96.00%
40% of Initial 58,283 ($205,459) ($147,191) $58,268 28.36%
30% of Initial 43,712 ($364,921) ($298,264) $66,657 18.27%
25% of Initial 36,427 ($461,167) ($383,959) $77,208 16.74%
• Equivalent days at sea are per vessel
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the transferral of quota 
between individual vessels (A-H) at different levels of quota 
allocated and the resulting percentage quota amounts per vessel 
Note that vessel I left the fishery at 25% quota allocation 
levels for both ITE and ITQ programs, since its valuation of 
quota at this amount was below the market-formed equilibrium 
price for the fleet.
Figure 12. Quota Distribution After 
Trade (ITE Model)
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Figure 13. Quota Distribution After 
Trade (ITQ Model)
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Figure 14 depicts the increased amount of landings by vessel 
under an ITE-regulated program as opposed to an ITQ-regulated 
program at varying levels of initial quota allocated. Average 
vessel landings increase under an ITE regime relative to an ITQ 
program at the same allocation level because the more efficient 
vessels that demand quota are generally capable of catching more 
scallops in the same period of time relative to less-efficient 
vessels.
Figure 14. Additional Landings Per 
Vessel Under An ITE Vs. An ITQ Program
Landings Per Year (Thousands)
m
% of Initial Quota Allocation
Differences in fleet rent per year as the result of allowing 
transferability of quota amongst vessels are depicted by figures 
15 and 16. Although transferability between vessels increases 
rent to the fleet at all quota amounts depicted, its effects are 
less at the higher quota amounts, primarily because of vessel 
capacity constraints of the more efficient vessels.
$600
$400
$200
$0
-$200
-$ 4 0 0
$600
$400
$200
$0
-$200
-$ 4 0 0
-$600
Figure 15. Fleet Rents Per Year 
(NTE/ITE Model -  Before And After Trade)
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Figure 16. Fleet Rents Per Year 
(ITQ Model -  Before And After Trade)
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Finally, percentage rent gains for the fleet as the result 
of adopting either an ITE- or ITQ-oriented management program are 
demonstrated at varying levels of quota in figures 17 and 18.
Figure 17. Percentage Rent Gains As 
Result Of Quota Trade In An ITE Program
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Figure 18. Percentage Rent Gains As 
Result Of Quota Trade In An ITQ Program
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COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
Inverse Derived Demand for Quota
Inverse derived demand for quota by individual vessels 
relative to one another varied as predicted by economic theory. 
The most efficient vessels within the fleet (those whose profit 
per unit of quota was largest) were willing to pay the greatest 
amount per unit of quota at the various levels of quota supplied 
to the fleet.
At the 90% level of quota allocation, according to the ITE 
model, vessels did not demand quota following trade, despite the 
fact that similar amounts were indeed caught during the sample 
period. This discrepancy between the models and reality was 
probably caused by fishing vessels' inability to accurately 
predict landings and resulting revenues and costs prior to the 
actual trip taking place. In other words, a number of trips 
(primarily during the winter months) were ultimately unprofitable 
during the 1987-1991 period.
Thus, with 20/20 hindsight, unprofitable trips most likely 
would not have been made by profit-maximizing firms. Therefore, 
with hindsight, vessels would demand less quota, causing the 
equilibrium market price of $0.00 per unit of quota at the 90% 
quota allotment. Again, any equilibrium market price less than 
or equal to $0.00 per unit will result in an equilibrium market
44
45
price of $0.00 per unit.
Fleet Rents Before Trade
According to the NTE/ITE model, fleet rent was greatest at 
the initial days at sea allocation of 255.6 days per vessel. 
Short-run rents are completely dissipated (equal $0.00) at 
approximately 4 5% of initial quota (about 115 days at sea per 
vessel). Likewise, the ITQ model predicts maximum fleet rent at 
the initial quota allocation. However, total rent dissipation is 
estimated to occur for an initial quota of approximately 54% 
(which yields about 82,000 pounds per vessel).
It is imperative to recognize that differences in fleet rent 
between the NTE/ITE model and the ITQ model are not directly 
comparable at each level of quota allocated when evaluating 
potential economic benefits garnered under either management 
program. Since a NTE/ITE program limits days at sea, individual 
vessels constrained by such a management regime would fish in 
order to maximize profits on a per day basis. On the other hand, 
individual vessels within an ITQ program would fish in order to 
maximize profits for every pound of scallops caught.
Thus, vessels may fish during different times of the year 
under each management technique. Furthermore, predicted landings 
at the varying levels of quota following initial allocation 
differ under each program. For instance, at the 50% quota level, 
the NTE/ITE model allows 127.8 days at sea and would result in an 
average landings per vessel of approximately 87,611 pounds;
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whereas the ITQ model at 5 0% the quota level allows only an 
average of 72,853 pounds per vessel thereby accounting for the 
vast difference in fleet rents between the two programs at 
various quota levels.
Equilibrium Market Price
Following open market trade within an ITE or ITQ management 
program, an equilibrium market price per unit of quota forms 
depending upon quota supplied. As predicted by economic theory, 
under both an ITE and ITQ program, estimated inter-fleet quota 
price is greatest at the smallest quota amount (25% of initial 
level) and smallest at the largest quota amount (100% of initial 
quota). This is caused by the monthly variations in catch rate 
and scallop price and other factors which result in some days 
during the year being more marginally profitable than others.
Worthy of note is the fact that within both models, landings 
capacity (or the approximate maximum amount of scallops that a 
vessel could catch during a year) was reached at the larger quota 
amounts by the more efficient vessels of the fleet. Resulting 
quota prices would have been higher at the larger quota 
allocation levels if the landings capability of the more 
efficient vessels were increased. For example, under the ITQ 
model at the 50% quota allotment, vessel H (the most efficient 
vessel of the fleet) valued quota at $1.22 per pound, while the 
rest of the fleet valued quota at $1.01 per pound. Yet, since 
vessel H had reached its maximum landings capability during a
47
year, equilibrium market price remained at $1.01 per pound.
Thus, if the landings capability of vessel H were increased, 
the effects would be two-fold. First, vessel H would increase 
its quota holdings and equilibrium market price would reform at a 
price greater than $1.01/pound, but less than $1.22/pound.
Second, overall fleet rent gains through trade would increase 
under either management program as the more efficient vessels 
would gain a greater proportion of quota. Such effects are 
important to note if any management regime (NTE, ITE, or ITQ) 
allowed increased effort (regardless of intent), because of the 
increased economic value gained by the tradable nature of the 
management program.
Fleet Rents After Trade
Greatest profitability again was achieved at initial quota 
allocations for both the ITE and ITQ model, while negative fleet 
returns resulted at the smaller quota allocations. The ITE model 
predicted that fleet rents were driven to zero at approximately 
40% of the initial quota allocation compared to 45% if trade were 
not allowed. Likewise, the ITQ model implied rent dissipation to 
begin below the 51% level compared to 54% if trade were not 
allowed.
Rent after trade was greater at all quota amounts for both 
models indicating that trade did indeed result in overall 
efficiency gains for the fleet. Nominal rent gains under both 
ITE and ITQ models generally increased as supplied quota amounts
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were tightened. The largest nominal gains occurred at the 30% 
and 2 5% quota allocation amounts for the ITE and ITQ models 
respectively. However, on a percentage basis, the largest rent 
gains from trade resulted at the 50% quota level of the ITE and 
ITQ models where 105.53% and 96.00% rent gains occurred 
respectively.
Although these sample vessels may or may not be 
representative of the entire 223 full-time vessels that currently 
comprise the fleet for Placopecten magellanicus, if the sample 
results for each model were extrapolated over the entire fleet, 
total nominal fleet rents after trade would increase an estimated 
$1,923,803 under an ITE-regulated management program, and 
$1,971,335 under an ITQ program.
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Table 10. Extrapolated Rent Gains From Trade For 
The Entire Full-Time East Coast Fleet (ITE Model)
Quota Equivalent Total Estimated Rent Gains
Allocated Days/Vessel Landings From Trade
Initial 255.6 32,706,909 $32,361
90% of Initial 230.0 32,706,909 $528,729
80% of Initial 204.5 30,360,987 $850,994
70% of Initial 178.9 27,568,431 $1,309,900
60% of Initial 153.4 24,576,089 $1,752,419
50% of Initial 127.8 20,998,012 $1,923,803
40% of Initial 102.2 17,262,323 $1,797,025
30% of Initial 76.7 13,335,143 $2,657,598
25% of Initial 63.9 11,235,700 $1,878,731
* All landings are in pounds
Table 11. Extrapolated Rent Gains From Trade For 
The Entire Full-Time East Coast Fleet (ITQ Model)
Quota Equivalent Total Estimated Rent Gains
Allocated Landings/Vessel Landings From Trade
Initial 145,706 33,949,498 $290,499
90% of Initial 131,136 30,554,688 $919,004
80% of Initial 116,565 27,159,645 $1,351,970
70% of Initial 101,994 23,764,602 $1,590,846
60% of Initial 87,424 20,369,792 $1,572,232
50% of Initial 72,853 16,974,749 $1,971,335
40% of Initial 58,283 13,579,939 $1,508,494
30% of Initial 43,712 10,184,896 $1,725,676
25% of Initial 36,427 8,487,491 $1,998,829
* All landings are in pounds
The small rent gains that resulted around the initial quota 
allocation levels for either model were again caused by certain 
vessels achieving capacity levels; if capacity were increased on 
these vessels, rent gains from trade would have increased.
Quota Distribution After Trade
In comparing the ITE and ITQ model, greater landings would 
occur under an ITE regime at equal levels of quota allocation 
(other than the initial quota level). The nominal difference in 
landings peaks at the 6 0% quota level, where the average vessel 
in an ITE program would catch in excess of 18,000 pounds of 
scallops more than the average vessel in an ITQ program during a 
year.
In addition, according to the ITE model prior to trade, each 
vessel would own 11.1% of the total days at sea quota for the 
fleet. Following trade, at the 100% allocation level, vessel H 
(the most efficient vessel at this quota level) would immediately 
increase its quota holdings to about 13% of the total fleet 
holdings, while vessel I (one of the least efficient vessels) 
would decrease its quota to 9% of the overall fleet quota.
Similar transferral of quota amongst vessels would occur at each 
overall quota allocation level. At the smallest amount of effort 
allocation (25% level), the model predicted that vessel H would 
own about 28% of all quota, while vessel I would sell all of its 
quota and leave the fishery.
Similarly, following trade at the 100% quota allocation 
level, the ITQ model predicted that vessel H would obtain 15% of 
the fleet quota, while vessel I would own 9%. At the 25% quota
level, vessel H would control an even greater 3 9% of all quota,
while vessel I once again would leave the fishery.
The differences between the ITE and ITQ models in quota
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distribution amongst the vessels comprising the fleet is 
attributable to the differing methods by which the vessels would 
value quota under either management program and the differing 
landings and days at sea at varying percentages of initial quota 
allocated.
CONCLUSIONS
NTEs, ITEs and ITQs each embody a major change in management 
of the scallop fishery. All three alternatives attempt to 
conserve the scallop population in order to maintain a maximum 
spawning potential of approximately 5% of the overall scallop 
population. However, NTEs and ITEs require estimating resulting 
future landings caused by limits on fishing effort, as opposed to 
ITQs which directly limit total landings.
ITE- and ITQ-based management programs offer the sample 
fleet greater economic rents compared to the current NTE-oriented 
management program. Although such results may not necessarily 
reflect the potential outcome of either management approach on 
the east coast scallop fleet as a whole, if these results were 
extrapolated over the whole fleet, an additional estimated 
$1,923,803.00 in total rent would be generated by the vessels 
remaining in the fishery at present catch levels if trading were 
allowed between vessels of current days at sea effort quotas.
Allowing transferability of effort within the current 
management program would most likely have a number of effects. 
First, effort quota would likely end up in the hands of the more 
efficient vessel owners within the fishery assuming (1) industry 
accepts the new changes in the management program, (2) an open 
market system for freely-tradable quota forms, and (3)
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alternative fisheries or uses for the vessels likely to be forced 
from the fishery are available. (A government-supported vessel 
buyback program, although costly, may resolve this problem. The 
option of a buyback program is currently under consideration by 
NOAA) .
Second, transferability of quota within an ITE program would 
cause increased landings of scallops compared to an NTE or ITQ 
program at similar percentages of initial quota allotments. In 
other words, a 10% reduction in effort would result in less than 
a 10% reduction in overall landings. For example, at a quota 
level equivalent to 50% of 19 87-91 levels, the average vessel in 
the sample fleet would catch an estimated 17,000+ pounds per year 
more under an ITE program than an ITQ program. Therefore, 
if management considers making the current quotas on effort 
transferable, an analysis should be conducted to estimate the 
potential increase in landings by the entire fleet, as more 
productive vessels would gain a greater percentage of overall 
quota.
Finally, a potential downside to allowing transferability is 
the potential monopolization of quota. Following the 
introduction of either an ITE or ITQ management program, 
distribution of quota amongst a relatively small group of large, 
highly-efficient vessels may result if regulations do not 
proactively prevent it.
The adoption of an ITE or ITQ program would be of greatest 
help (on a percentage basis) to the sample fleet if catch rates
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were approximately 50% of those during the 1987-1991 period.
Since current catch rates are roughly around this amount, the 
potential economic benefits of adopting an ITE- or ITQ-regulated 
management program are significant.
Given that the elimination of the meat count standard under 
the current management program may increase short-run harvest 
amounts and elevate meat counts (per pound) (Kirkley and Dupaul, 
1991), the adoption of an ITQ program may resolve these problems. 
Since an ITQ-regulated regime constrains overall landings per 
vessel per year, vessel operators would likely target larger (20- 
40 count) scallops which return a greater price per pound than 
smaller (4 0-70 count) scallops (high grading). Thus, an ITQ 
program could forcibly dissuade the potential targeting of the 
currently abundant juvenile stock by the fleet.
However, under an ITE or ITQ program, crew members may not 
benefit as a whole. As quota transfers to more efficient 
vessels, fewer and fewer vessels would theoretically remain in 
the fishery if quota shrinks as currently planned. Thus, with 
fewer vessels in the fishery, more crew members would be forced 
to find alternative employment. As most east coast fisheries are 
currently fully- or over-exploited, opportunities to these 
departing men and women would probably be in other industries.
The current management regime of the scallop fishery, on the 
other hand, may represent a favored alternative to a number of 
crew members as neither vessels nor crew members are essentially 
forced out of the fishery (in the short run).
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Finally, a potential point of contention relates to 
potential ownership of quota. Who would own the quota? Vessel 
owners, captains, crew members or joint-ownership? If ownership 
were spread across all involved members of the fishery under an 
ITE or ITQ program, all would receive a paycheck if quota were 
sold on the open market. However, if quota is held solely by 
vessel owners, only they would benefit if quota were sold on the 
open market.
Thus, the adoption of any property-rights based system of 
fishery management within the Placopecten magellanicus fishery 
clearly requires careful planning and a proactive resolution of 
potential problems. This study outlines a useful procedure that 
managers of the fishery could utilize to make further economic 
predictions before the potential introduction of a new management 
technique.
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